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Abstract. We describe an asynchronous algorithm to solve secure mul-
tiparty computation (MPC) over n players, when strictly less than a 1
8
fraction of the players are controlled by a static adversary. For any func-
tion f over a field that can be computed by a circuit with m gates, our
algorithm requires each player to send a number of field elements and
perform an amount of computation that is O˜(m
n
+
√
n). This significantly
improves over traditional algorithms, which require each player to both
send a number of messages and perform computation that is Ω(nm).
Additionaly, we define the threshold counting problem and present a dis-
tributed algorithm to solve it in the asynchronous communication model.
Our algorithm is load balanced, with computation, communication and
latency complexity of O(logn), and may be of independent interest to
other applications with a load balancing goal in mind.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a renaissance in secure multiparty computation (MPC),
but unfortunately, the distributed computing community is in danger of missing
out. In particular, while new MPC algorithms boast dramatic improvements
in latency and communication costs, none of these algorithms offer significant
improvements in the highly distributed case, where the number of players is large.
This is unfortunate, since MPC holds the promise of addressing many impor-
tant problems in distributed computing. How can peers in Bittorrent auction off
resources without hiring an auctioneer? How can we design a decentralized Twit-
ter that enables provably anonymous broadcast of messages. How can we create
deep learning algorithms over data spread among large clusters of machines?
In this paper, we take a first step towards solving MPC for large distributed
systems. We describe algorithms that require each player to send a number of
messages and perform an amount of computation that is O˜(mn +
√
n), where
n is the number of players and m is the number of gates in the circuit to be
computed. This significantly improves over current algorithms, which require
each player to both send a number of messages and perform computation that
is Ω(nm). We now describe our model and problem.
Model There are n players, with a private and authenticated channel between
every pair of players. Communication is via asynchronous message passing, so
? Partially supported by NSF CAREER Award 0644058 and NSF CCR-0313160.
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that sent messages may be arbitrarily and adversarially delayed. Latency in this
model is defined as the maximum length of any chain of messages (see [11,3]).
We assume a Byzantine adversary controls an unknown subset of up to t
of the players. These players are bad (i.e. Byzantine) and the remaining players
are good. The good players run our algorithm, but the bad players may deviate
in an arbitrary manner. Our adversary is static, i.e. it must select the set of
bad players at the start of our algorithm. The adversary is computationally
unbounded. Thus, we make no cryptographic hardness assumptions.
MPC Problem: Each player, pi, has a private input xi. All players know a
n-ary function f . We want to ensure that: 1) all players learn the value of f on
the inputs; and 2) the inputs remain as private as possible: each player pi learns
nothing about the private inputs other than what is revealed by the output of
f and the player’s private value xi.
In the asynchronous setting, the problem is challenging even with a trusted
third party. In particular, the trusted party can not determine the difference
between a message never being sent and a message being arbitrarily delayed,
and so the t bad players can always refrain from sending any messages to the
trusted party. Thus, the trusted party must wait to receive n − t inputs. Then
it must compute the function f using default values for the missing inputs, and
send the output back to the players as well as the number of received inputs.3
The goal of an asynchronous MPC protocol is to simulate the above scenario,
without the trusted third party.
The function to be computed is presented as a circuit C with m gates. For
convenience of presentation, we assume each gate has fan-in two and fan-out at
most two. For any two gates x and y in C, if the output of x is input to y, we
say that x is a child of y and that y is a parent of x. We also assume that all
computations in the circuit occur over a finite field F; The size of F depends
on the specific function to be computed but must always be Ω(log n). All the
inputs, outputs and messages sent during the protocol are elements of F, and
consequently, messages will be of size log |F|.
Our MPC result requires solutions to the following two problems, which may be
of independent interest.
Threshold Counting There are n good players each with a bit initially set to
0. At least τ of the players will eventually set their bits to 1. The goal is for all
the players to learn when the number of bits with values 1 is at least τ .
Quorum Formation There are n players, up to t of whom may be bad. A
quorum is a set of c log n players for some constant c. A quorum is called good if
the fraction of bad players in it is at most t/n+ δ for a fixed positive δ. We want
all n players to agree on a set of n good quorums, and we want the quorums to
be load-balanced: each player is mapped to O(log n) quorums.
1.1 Our Results
The main result of this paper is summarized by the following theorem.
3 We send back only the number of inputs used, not the set of players whose inputs
are used. This is required to ensure scalability; see Section 6.
Theorem 1. Assume there are n players, less than a 18 −  fraction of which
are bad for some fixed  > 0, and an n-ary function, f that can be computed by
a circuit of depth d with m gates. If all good players follow Algorithm 1, then
with high probability (w.h.p.), they will solve MPC, while ensuring:
1. Each player sends at most O˜(mn +
√
n) field elements,
2. Each player performs O˜(mn +
√
n) computations, and
3. Expected total latency is O(dpolylog(n)).
Our additional results are given by the following two theorems.
Theorem 2. Assume n good players follow Algorithm τ-Counter. Then w.h.p.,
the algorithm solves the threshold counting problem, while ensuring:
1. Each player sends at most O(log n) messages of constant size,
2. Each player receives at most O(log n) messages,
3. Each player performs O(log n) computations,
4. Total latency is O(log n).
Theorem 3. Assume n players, up to t < ( 14 − )n of whom are bad, for fixed
 > 0. If all good players follow the Create-Quorum protocol, the following
are ensured w.h.p.:
1. The players agree on n good quorums,
2. Each player sends at most O˜(
√
n) bits,
3. Each player performs O˜(
√
n) computations,
4. Total latency is O(polylog(n)).
In the rest of the paper we discuss the algorithms and ideas involved in
obtaining these results. Detailed proofs are deferred to the full version [16].
2 Related Work
The study of secure computation started in 1982 with the seminal work of
Yao [27]. Later Goldrich, Micali, and Wigderson [20] proposed the first generic
scheme for solving a cryptographic notion of MPC. This work was followed by
some unconditionally-secure schemes in late 1980s [6,10,26,5,21,22,4]. Unfortu-
nately, these methods all have poor communication scalability that prevents
their wide-spread use. In particular, if there are n players involved in the com-
putation and the function f is represented by a circuit with m gates, then these
algorithms require each player to send a number of messages and perform a
number of computations that is Ω(mn) (see [18,19,17]).
Recent years have seen exciting improvements in the cost of MPC when m
is much larger than n [12,14,13]. For example, the computation and communi-
cation cost for the algorithm described by Damg˚ard et al. in [13] is O˜(m) plus
a polynomial in n. However, the additive polynomial in n is large (e.g. Ω(n6))
and so these new algorithms are only efficient for relatively small n. Thus, there
is still a need for MPC algorithms that are efficient in both n and m.
We first introduced the notion of using quorums for local communication
to decrease the message cost in a brief announcement [15]. In that paper, we
described a synchronous protocol with bit complexity of O˜(mn +
√
n) per player
that can tolerate a computationally unbounded adversary who controls up to
( 14 − ) fraction of the players for any fixed positive . This paper improves
our previous result by handling asynchronous communication. One important
challenge in the asynchronous communication model is to ensure that at least
n−t inputs are committed to, before the circuit evaluation. To address this issue
we introduce and solve the threshold counting problem.
Boyle, Goldwasser, and Tessaro [8] describe a synchronous cryptographic
protocol to solve MPC problem that is also based on quorums. Their algo-
rithm uses a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme and thus, tolerates
a computationally-bounded adversary that can take control of up to ( 13 − )
fraction of players for any fixed positive . Their protocol requires each player
to send polylog(n) messages of size O˜(n) bits and requires polylog(n) rounds.
Interestingly the cost of the protocol is independent of the circuit size.
Counting Networks Threshold counting can be solved in a load-balanced
way using counting networks, which were first introduced by Aspnes, Herlihy,
and Shavit [2]. Counting networks are constructed from simple two-input two-
output computing elements called balancers connected to one another by wires.
A counting network can count any number of inputs even if they arrive at ar-
bitrary times, are distributed unevenly among the input wires, and propagate
through the network asynchronously. Aspnes, Herlihy, and Shavit [2] establish
an O(log2 n) upper bound on the depth complexity of counting networks. Since
the latency of counting is dependent to the depth of the network, minimizing the
network’s depth is a goal for papers in this area. A simple explicit construction of
an O(log nclog
∗ n)-depth counting network, and a randomized construction of an
O(log n)-depth counting networkwhich works with high probability is described
in [24,25]. These constructions use the AKS sorting network [1] as a building
block. While the AKS sorting network and the resulting counting networks have
O(log n) depth, large hidden constants render them impractical. We note that
the threshold counting problem is simpler than general counting.
3 Preliminaries
We say an event occurs with high probability (w.h.p), if it occurs with proba-
bility at least 1 − 1/nc, for some c > 0 and sufficiently large n. We assume all
computations occur over a finite field F. Every time we use a mask during the
protocol, we assume the mask is a value chosen uniformly at random from F.
We now describe protocols that we use as building blocks in this paper.
Secret Sharing In secret sharing, a player, called the dealer, wants to distribute
a secret amongst a group of participants, each of whom is allocated a share of
the secret. The secret can be reconstructed only when a sufficient number of
shares are combined together and each of the shares reveals nothing to the player
possessing it. If a method is used to ensure the dealer sends shares of a real secret
and not just some random numbers, then the new scheme is called Verifiable
Secret Sharing (VSS). As our model is asynchronous, we use the asynchronous
VSS (or AVSS) scheme described by Benor, Canneti and Goldreich in [5]. We
denote the sharing phase by Avss-Share and the reconstruction phase by Avss-
Rec. The protocol of [5] works correctly even if up to 14 of the players are bad.
The latency of the protocols is O(1) and the communication cost is poly(q),
where q is the number of players participating in the protocol. In this paper, we
will use the protocols only among small sets of players (quorums) of logarithmic
size, so q will be O(log n) and the communication cost per invocation will be
polylog(n).
Heavy-Weight MPC We use a heavy-weight asynchronous algorithm for MPC
donated by Hw-MPC. This algorithm, due to Ben-Or et al. [5], is an errorless
MPC protocol that tolerates up to 14 bad players. Let q be the number of players
who run a Hw-MPC to compute a circuit with O(q) gates. The expected latency
of Hw-MPC is O(q) and the number of messages sent poly(q). In this paper,
we will use Hw-MPC only for logarithmic number of players and gates, i.e. ,
q = O(log n) and the communication cost per invocation is polylog(n).4
Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement In the Byzantine agreement problem,
each player is initially given an input bit. All good players want to agree on a bit
which coincides with at least one of their input bits. Every time a broadcast is
required in our protocol, we use an asynchronous Byzantine agreement algorithm
from [9], which we call Asynch-BA.
4 Technical Overview
We briefly sketch the ideas behind our three results.
Quorum-Based Gate Evaluation The main idea for reducing the amount of
communication required in evaluating the circuit is quorum-based gate evalua-
tion. Unfortunately, if each player participates in the computation of the whole
circuit, it must communicate with all other players. Instead, in quorum-based
gate evaluation, each gate of the circuit is computed by a gate gadget. A gate
gadget consists of three quorums: two input quorums and one output quorum.
Input quorums are associated with the gate’s children which serve inputs to the
gate. Output quorum is associated with the gate itself and is responsible to cre-
ate a shared random mask and maintain the output of the quorum for later use
in the circuit. As depicted in Figure 1, these gate gadgets connect to form the
entire circuit. In particular, for any gate g, the output quorum of g’s gadget is
the input quorum of the gate gadget for all of g’s parents (if any).
The players in each gate gadget run Hw-MPC among themselves to perform
the gate operation. To make sure the computation is correct and secure, each
gate gadget maintains the invariant that the value computed by the gadget is
the value that the corresponding gate in the original circuit would compute,
masked by a uniformly random element of the field. This random number is not
4 To make sure our algorithm has the expected total latency equal to O(d polylog(n)),
every time we need to run the Hw-MPC algorithm, we run O(logn) same copy of
it each for O(polylog(n)) steps.
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Fig. 1. The gate gadgets for gate g and its left and right children.
known to any individual player. Instead, shares of it are held by the members
of the output quorum. Thus, the output quorum can participate as an input
quorum for the evaluation of any parent gate and provide the masked version of
the inputs and shares of the mask.
This gate gadget computation is continued in the same way for all gates of
the circuit until the final output of whole circuit is evaluated. This technique for
evaluating a gate of the circuit using quorums, is illustrated in Figure 5.2 and
the details are described in Section 5.1.
Threshold Counting Our interest in threshold counting for this paper is to
ensure that at least n−t inputs are committed to, before the circuit evaluation oc-
curs. To solve the threshold counting problem, we design a new distributed data
structure and algorithm called τ-Counter. The τ-Counter enables thresh-
old counting with asynchronous communication, and may be of use for other
problems beyond MPC.
To give intuition, we first consider a naive approach for counting in asyn-
chronous model. Assume a complete binary tree where each player sends its
input to a unique leaf node when it is set to 1. Then, for every node v, each
child of v sends v a message showing the number of inputs it has received so far
and it sends the updated message every time this number changes. The problem
with this approach is that it is not load-balanced: each node at depth i has n2i
descendants in the tree, and therefore, in the worst case, sends and receives n2i
messages. Thus, a child of the root sends n/2 messages to the root and receives
the same number of messages from its children. To solve the load-balancing prob-
lem, we use a randomized approach which ensures w.h.p. that each leaf of the
data structure receives at least 7 log n messages and does not communicate with
its parent until it has done so. Subsequnt messages it receives are not forwarded
to its parent but rather to other randomly chosen leaves to ensure a close to uni-
form distribution of the messages. The details of our algorithm are described in
Section 5.1 and more formally in Algorithm 2. Theorem 2 describes the resource
complexity of the algorithm.
Asynchronous Quorum Formation Recently, King et al. [23] described an
efficient algorithm to solve the quorum formation problem, w.h.p., in the syn-
chronous model with full information. Our new algorithm, Create-Quorum,
builds on the result of [23] to solve the quorum formation problem in the asyn-
chronous model, with private channels. The properties of Create-Quorum, are
described by Theorem 3. The algorithm and the proof are deferred to the full
version [16] due to space restrictions.
5 Our Algorithm
Our algorithm makes use of a circuit graph, G, which is based on the circuit C
that computes f . We assume the gates of the circuit C are numbered 1, 2, . . . ,m,
where the gate numbered 1 is the output gate. The circuit graph is a directed
acyclic graph over m+n nodes. There are n of these nodes, one per player, that
we call input nodes. There are m remaining nodes, one per gate, that we call
gate nodes. For every pair of gate nodes x and y, there is an edge from x to y iff
the output of the gate represented by node x is an input to the gate represented
by node y. Also, for any input node z and gate node y, there is an edge from
z to y if the player represented by gate node z has an input that feeds into the
gate represented by node y. Similar to our definition in C, for any two nodes x
and y in G, if x has an edge to y, we say that x is a child of y and that y is a
parent of x. Also, for a given node v, we will say the height of v is the number
of edges on the longest path from v to any input node in G. For each node in G,
we define the following variables. Qv is the quorum associated with node v. yv
is the output of the gate corresponding to v. Finally, rv is a random mask and
yˆv is the masked output associated with node v, i.e. yˆv = yv + rv.
We number the nodes of G canonically in such a way that the input node
numbered i corresponds to player pi. We refer to the node corresponding to the
output gate as the output node.
Algorithm 1 consists of four parts. The first part is to run Create-Quorum
in order to agree on n good quorums. The second part of the algorithm is Input-
Commitment in which, quorums form the count tree. Then, each player pi
commits its input values to quorum i at the leaf nodes of the count tree and
finally the players in that quorum decide whether these values are part of the
computation or not. The details of this part of the algorithm is described in
Section 5.1. The third part of the algorithm is evaluation of the circuit, described
in detail in Section 5.2). Finally, the output from the circuit evaluation is sent
back to all the players by quorums arranged in a complete binary tree.
Algorithm 1 Main Algorithm
1. All players run Create-Quorum,
2. All players run Input-Commitment,
3. All players run Circuit-Eval,
4. Propagate the output by quorums arranged in a complete binary tree.
5.1 Input-Commitment
In this section we describe a Monte Carlo algorithm, called τ-Counter that
performs threshold counting for a threshold τ ≥ n/2.
The algorithm consists of up and down stages. For the up stage the players
are arranged in a (pre-determined) tree data structure consisting of a root node
with O(log n) children, each of which is itself the root of a complete binary tree;
these subtrees have varying depths. The players in the trees count the number of
1-inputs, i.e. the number of players’ inputs that are set to 1. As a result, the root
can decide when the threshold is reached. In the down stage, the root notifies
all the players of this event via a complete binary tree of depth log n. Note that
the trees used in the up and down stages have the same root. In what follows,
unless otherwise specified, “tree” will refer to the tree data structure used for
the up stage.
Let D = dlog τ14 logne. Note that D = O(log n). The root of our tree has
degree D. Each of the D children of the root is itself the root of a complete
binary subtree, which we will call a collection subtree. For 1 ≤ j ≤ D, the jth
collection subtree has depth D + 1 − j. Player 1 is assigned to the root and
players 2 to D + 1, are assigned to its children, i.e. the roots of the collection
subtrees, with player j+ 1 being assigned to the jth child. The remaining nodes
of the collection trees are assigned players in order, starting with D + 2, left to
right and top to bottom. One can easily see that the entire data structure has
fewer than n nodes, (in fact it has fewer than τ3 logn nodes) so some players will
not be assigned to any node.
The leaves of each collection subtree are collection nodes while the internal
nodes of each collection tree are adding nodes.
When a player’s input is set to 1, it sends a 〈Flag〉 message, which we will
sometimes simply refer to as a flag, to a uniformly random collection node from
the first collection subtree. Intuitively, we want the flags to be distributed close
to evenly among the collection nodes. The parameters of the algorithm are set
up so that w.h.p. each collection node receives at least 7 log n 〈Flag〉 messages.
Each collection node in the jth collection tree waits until it has received
7 log n flags. It then sends its parent a 〈Count〉 message. For each additional flag
received, up to 14 log n, it chooses a uniformly random collection node in the
(j + 1)st collection subtree and forwards a flag to it. If j = D then it forwards
these 14 log n flags directly to the root. Subsequent flags are ignored. Again, we
use the randomness to ensure a close to even distribution of flags w.h.p.
Each adding node waits until it has received a 〈Count〉 message from each of
its children. Then it sends a 〈Count〉 message to its parent. We note that each
adding node sends exactly one message during the algorithm. The parameters of
the algorithm are arranged so that all the 〈Count〉 messages that are sent in the
the jth collection subtree together account for τ/2j of the 1-inputs. Thus all the
〈Count〉 messages in all the collection subtrees together account for τ (1− 1
2D
)
of the 1-inputs. At least τ
2D
1-inputs remain unaccounted for. These and upto
O(log n) more are collected as flags at the root.
When player 1, at the root, has accounted for at least τ 1-inputs, it starts the
down stage by sending the 〈Done〉 message to players 2 and 3. For j > 1, when
player j receives the 〈Done〉 message, it forwards to players 2j and 2j+ 1. Thus,
eventually the 〈Done〉 message reaches all the players, who then know that the
threshold has been met. The formal algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 τ-Counter
n is the number of players, τ is the threshold. D = dlog( τ
14 logn
)e
1. Setup (no messages sent here):
(a) Build the data structure:
– Player 1 is the root.
– For 1 ≤ j ≤ D, player j + 1 is a child of the root and the root of the jth
collection subtree, which has depth D + 1− j.
– The remainder of the nodes in the collection subtrees are assigned to
players left to right and top to bottom, starting with player D + 2.
(b) Let sum = 0 for the root.
2. Up stage
(a) Individual Players: upon input change to 1 choose a uniformly random collec-
tion node v from collection subtree 1 and send a 〈Flag〉 to v.
(b) Collection nodes in collection subtree j:
– Upon receiving 7 log n 〈Flag〉s from collection subtree j − 1, if j > 1, or
from individual players if j = 1, send parent a 〈Count〉 message.
– Upon subsequently receiving a 〈Flag〉, send it to a uniformly random col-
lection node in collection subtree j + 1, if j < D. If j = D then send
these directly to the root. Do this for up to 14 log n flags. Then ignore all
subsequent 〈Flag〉 messagess.
(c) Adding nodes: Upon receiving 〈Count〉 messages from both children, send par-
ent a 〈Count〉 message.
(d) Root: While sum < τ
– Upon receiving a 〈Count〉 message from the root of collection subtree j,
increment sum by τ/2j
– Upon receiving a 〈Flag〉 message, add one to sum.
3. Down stage (now sum ≥ τ)
(a) Player 1 (the root): Send 〈Done〉 to Players 2 and 3, then terminate.
(b) Player j for j > 1: Upon receiving 〈Done〉 from Player bj/2c, forward it to
Players 2j and 2j + 1 (if they exist) and then terminate.
The algorithm Input-Commitment is based on τ-Counter assuming that
the nodes in the data structure are assigned quorums. We assume that the
quorums have a canonical numbering Q1, Q2, . . . Qn and the role of “player” i in
τ-Counter is played by quorum Qi. When we say quorum A sends a message
M to quorum B, we mean that every (good) player in quorum A sends M to
every player in quorum B. A player in quorum B is said to have received M
from A if it receives M from at least 7/8 of the players in A.
Algorithm 3 Input-Commitment
Run the following algorithms in parallel:
1. Algorithm IC-Player.
2. Algorithm IC-Input.
3. Algorithm τ -Counter with τ = n− t and with quorums as participants.
Algorithm 4 IC-Player
Run by player pi with input xi
1. Qv ← the quorum at the leaf node v associated with input of player pi
2. Sample a uniformly random value from F and set rv to this value.
3. yˆv ← xi + rv
4. Send yˆv to all the players in Qv
5. Run Avss-Share to commit the secret value rv to the players in Qv.
Algorithm 5 IC-Input
Run by player pj in Quorum Qv associated with node v responsible for the input of pi
1. After receiving yˆv and a share of rv, participate in the Avss-Share verification
protocol and agreement protocol to determine whether consistent shares for rv and
the same yˆv are sent to everyone.
2. If the Avss-Share verification protocol and the agreement protocol end and it is
agreed that yˆv was the same for all and shares of rv are valid and consistent, set
bi,j ← 1 and you are ready to start the τ -Counter algorithm with 〈Flag〉 message.
3. Upon receiving 〈Done〉 from your parent quorum, participate in 5/8-Majority
using bi,j as your input. If it returns FALSE, reset yˆv to the default value and your
share of rv to 0.
The τ-Counter is used for input commitment in the following way. Let v
denote the input node associated with player pi who holds input xi. Quorum
Qi is assigned to this node. Player pi samples rv uniformly at random from F,
1) 2) 3)
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Fig. 2. Example Computation of a Gate associate with node v.
sets yˆv to xi + rv and sends yˆv to all players in Qi. Next, player pi uses Avss-
Share to commit to the secret value rv to all players in Qi. Once player pi has
verifiably completed this process for the values xi and rvi , we say that player
pi has committed its masked value to Qi, and each player pj in Qi then sets
a bit bi,j to 1. If player pi’s shares fail the verification process, then the bi,j ’s
are set to 0, which is also the default value. Note that the quorum Qi’s input
for τ-Counter will be 1 if 5/8 of the bi,j are 1. The quorums acting as nodes
in the τ-Counter data structure, run Algorithm 2 with threshold of n − t to
determine when at least n − t inputs have been committed. Note that when a
quorum has to select a random quorum to communicate with, they must agree
on the quorum via a multiparty computation.
Based on the down stage in τ-Counter, when at least n − t inputs have
been detected at the root node, it sends a 〈Done〉 message to all the quorums
via a complete binary tree. When a player pj who is a member of quorum Qi
receives the 〈Done〉 message, pj participates in a Hw-MPC with other members
of Qi, using bi,j as its input. This Hw-MPC determines if at least 5/8 of the
bits are set to 1. If they are, then the quorum determines that the i-th input
(xi) is part of the computation and uses the received value of yˆv and shares of
rv as their input into Gate-Eval. Otherwise, they set yˆv to the default input
and the shares of rv to 0. We call this the 5/8-Majority step.
5.2 Evaluating the Circuit
We assign nodes of G to quorums in the following way. The output node of G is
assigned to quorum 1; then every node in G numbered i (other than the output
node) is assigned to quorum number j, where j = (i mod n). Assume player
p is in quorum Qv at the leaf node v of count tree, which is the same quorum
assigned to input node v in G. The circuit evaluation phase of the protocol
for player p starts after the completion of the 5/8-Majority step for node v in
Input-Commitment. After this step, for each input node v, players in Qv know
the masked input yˆv and each has a share of the random element rv, although
the actual input and mask are unknown to any single player. The first step
is to generate shares of uniformly random field elements for all gate nodes. If
player p is in a quorum at gate node v, he generates shares of rv, a uniformly
random field element, by participating in the Mask-Generation algorithm.
These shares are needed as inputs to the subsequent run of Hw-MPC.
Algorithm 6 Circuit-Eval
Run by each player p in a quorum associated with each node v ∈ G
1. For each input node v, after finishing Input-Commitment with yˆv and a share of
rv as output, p uses these as inputs to Gate-Eval on each parent node of v.
2. For each gate node v:
(a) p runs Mask-Generation on v and gets a share of rv as output
(b) p runs Gate-Eval on v with its share of rv as the input and gets yˆv as output
(c) p runs Gate-Eval on each parent node of v with input yˆv and p’s share of rv
3. After finishing computation of the gate represented by the output node, the players
at the output node run Output-Rec to reconstruct the output.
Algorithm 7 Mask-Generation
This protocol is run by each player p in a quorum associated with each gate node v ∈ G
to generate rv.
1. Choose uniformly at random an element rp,v ∈ F (this must be done independently
each time this algorithm is run and independently of all other randomness used to
generate shares of inputs etc.)
2. Run Avss-Share to create verifiable secret shares of rp,v for each player in the
quorum associated with v and deal these shares to all the players in the quorum
associated with v including itself.
3. Participate in the Avss-Share verification protocol for each received share. If the
verification fails, set the particular share value to zero.
4. Add together all the shares (including the one dealt by yourself). This sum will be
player p’s share of the value rv.
Next, players form the gadget for each gate node v with children left(v) and
right(v) to evaluate the gate associated with v using Gate-Eval as depicted
in Figure 2. The values yleft(v) and yright(v) are the inputs to the gate associated
with v, and yv is the output of v as it would be computed by a trusted party.
First section of figure describes the initial conditions of the gate quorum and two
input quorums before participating in Hw-MPC. Each player in gate quorum
Qv has a share of the random element rv (via Mask-Generation). Every player
in the left input quorum Qleft(v) has the masked value yˆleft(v) = yleft(v) + rleft(v)
and a share of rleft(v) (resp. for the right input quorum). In the second section, all
the players of the three quorums run Hw-MPC, using their inputs, in order to
compute yˆv, which is equal to yv + rv. Third section shows the output of the gate
evaluation after participating in Hw-MPC. Each player in Qv now knows 1) the
output of the gate plus the value of rv; and 2) shares of rv. Thus, players in Qv
now have the input to perform the computation associated with the parents of
v (if any). Note that both yv and rv themselves are unknown to any individual.
The gate evaluation is performed for all gate nodes from the bottom of the
G to the top. The output of the quorum associated with the output node in G
is the output of the entire algorithm. Thus, this quorum will unmask the output
via Output-Rec. The last step of the algorithm is to send this output to all
players. We do via a complete binary tree of quorums, rooted at the output
quorum.
Algorithm 8 Gate-Eval
This protocol is run for each gate node v with children left(v) and right(v), the partic-
ipants are the players in Qv, Qleft(v) and Qright(v).
1. If you are a player in Qleft(v), (resp. Qright(v)) use (yˆleft(v), share of rleft(v)) (resp.
(yˆright(v), share of rright(v))) as your input to Hw-MPC. If you are a player in Qv,
use share of rv as your input to Hw-MPC.
2. Participate in Hw-MPC.
3. yˆv ← value returned by Hw-MPC.
Algorithm 9 Output-Rec
This protocol is run by all players in Qoutput-node.
1. Reconstruct routput-node from its shares using Avss-Rec.
2. Set the circuit output message: 〈O〉 ← yˆoutput-node− routput-node.
3. Send 〈O〉 to all players in the quorums numbered 2 and 3.
6 Some Remarks
As described in the introduction, the goal of MPC is to simulate a trusted third
party in computation of the circuit and then send back the computation result
to the players. Let S denote the set of players from whom input is received by
the (simulated) trusted party. Recall that |S| ≥ n − t.5 Thus, for an arbitrary
S a description of S requires Ω(n) bits, and cannot be sent back to the players
using only a scalable amount of communication. Therefore, we relax the standard
requirement that S be sent back to the players. Instead, we require that at the
5 We allow |S| > n− t because the adversary is not limited to delivering one message
at a time; two or more messages may be received simultaneously.
end of the protocol each good player learns the output of f ; whether or not their
own input was included in S; and the size of S.
Also note that although we have not explicitly included this in Input-
Commitment, it is very easy for the players to compute the size of the com-
putation set S. Once each input quorum Qi has performed the 5/8-Majority
step and agreed on the bit bi = 1i∈S they can simply use an addition circuit
to add these bits together and then disperse the result. This is an MPC, all of
whose inputs are held by good players, since each input bit bi is jointly held by
the entire quorum Qi and all the quorums are good. Thus the computation can
afford to wait for all n inputs and computes the correct sum.
In the protocol proposed in this paper, it may be the case that a player p
participates more than one time in the quorums performing a single instance of
Hw-MPC. In such a case, we allow p to play the role of more than one different
players in the MPC, one for each quorum to which p belongs. This ensures that
the fraction of bad players in any instance of Hw-MPC is always less than 1/4.
Hw-MPC maintains privacy guarantees even in the face of gossiping coalitions
of constant size. Thus, player p will learn no information beyond the output and
its own inputs after running this protocol.
7 Conclusion
We have described a Monte Carlo algorithm to perform asynchronous secure
multiparty computation in an scalable manner. Our algorithms are scalable in
the sense that they require each player to send O˜(mn +
√
n) messages and perform
O˜(mn +
√
n) computations. They tolerate a static adversary that controls up to
a 18 −  fraction of the players, for  any positive constant.
Many problems remain open including the following. Can we prove lower
bounds for the communication and computation costs for Monte Carlo MPC?
Can we implement and adapt our algorithm to make it practical for a MPC
problem such as the beet auction problem described in [7]. Finally, can we prove
upper and lower bounds for resource costs to solve MPC in the case where the
adversary is dynamic, able to take over players at any point during the algorithm?
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